Environmental policy and time consistency - emissions taxes and emissions trading by Kennedy, Peter W. & Laplante, Benoit
L,)PS  - a  361
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  23 51
Environmental Policy  As instruments  for controlling
pollution,  how do emissions
and Time Consistency  taxes  and emissions  trading
compare  in terms  of the
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Summary  findings
Kennedy and Laplante examine policy problems related  * If damage is strictly convex, efficiency may require
to the use of emissions taxes and emissions trading, two  partial adoption  of the new technology. In this case, the
market-based instruments for controlling pollution by  first-best tax policy is not time-consistent and the tax
getting regulated firms to adopt cleaner technologies. By  rate must be adjusted after adoption has taken place
attaching an explicit price to emissions, these instruments  (ratcheting). Ratcheting will induce an efficient
give firms an incentive to continually reduce their  equilibrium if there is a very large number of firms. If
volume of emissions.  there are relatively few firms, ratcheting creates too
Command-and-control  emissions standards create  many incentives to adopt the new technology.
incentives to adopt cleaner technologies only up to the  *  The first-best supply policy is time-consistent if there
point where the standards are no longer binding (at  is a very large number of firms. If there are relatively few
which point the shadow price on emissions falls to zero).  firms, the first-best supply policy may not be time-
But the ongoing incentives created by market-based  consistent, and the regulator must ratchet the supply of
instruments are not necessarily right, either. Time-  permits. With this policy, there are not enough incentives
consistency constraints on the setting of these  for firms to adopt the new technology.
instruments limit the regulator's ability to set policies  The results do not strongly favor one policy
that lead to efficiency in adopting technology options.  instrument over the other, but if the point of an
After examining the time-consistency properties of a  emissions trading program is to increase technological
Pigouvian emissions tax and of emissions trading,  efficiency, it is necessary to continually adjust the supply
Kennedy and Laplante find that:  of permits in response to technological change, even
- If damage is linear, efficiency in adopting  when damage is linear.
technologies involves either universal adoption of thie  This continual adjustment is not needed for an
new technology or universal retention of the old  emissions tax when damage is linear, which may give
technology, depending on the cost of adoption. The first-  emissions taxes an advantage over emissions trading.
best tax policy and the first-best permit-supply policy are
both time-consistent under these conditions.
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A key consideration in the choice of pollution control instruments is the incentive for
regulated firms to adopt cleaner technologies. The adoption of less polluting production
techniques holds the key to long term consumption growth with limited accompanying
environmental damage. More immediately, it allows firms to achieve pollution reduction
targets  at  lower  cost  and  with  potentially  smaller  impact  on  their  international
competitiveness. These issues are of particular importance to many developing countries
where high growth rates mean that a large number of key industrial technology choices
are being made on a daily basis. It is essential that those choices are the right ones if the
net benefits of growth are to be maximized.
There is a  wide array of pollution control policies available to regulators and each of
them have different properties with respect to incentives for technological change. In this
paper we focus on emission taxes and emissions trading. These market-based instruments
are becoming increasingly popular in practice due in part to their dynamic incentives. By
attaching an  explicit price  to  emissions, these policy  instruments create  an  ongoing
incentive for firms to continually reduce their emission volumes. In contrast, command-
and-control type emission standards create incentives to adopt cleaner technologies only
up to the point where the standards are no longer binding (at which point the shadow
price on emissions falls to zero). However, the ongoing incentives created by market-
based instruments are not necessarily the right incentives. In particular, time consistency
constraints on the setting of these instruments can potentially limit the ability of the
regulator to set polices that implement efficiency as rational expectations equilibria with
respect to technology adoption choices. This paper explores these time consistency issues
for Pigouvian emission taxes and emissions trading.
We examine the policy problem under a range of conditions relating to the structure of
the "pollution market" and the nature of the environmental damage. We show that time
consistency constraints do not limit the ability of the regulator to  achieve a first-best
outcome if there is a continuum of regulated firms or if environmental damage is linear in
aggregate emissions. However, if there are relatively few regulated firms, such that there
is strategic interaction between firms and the regulator, and  environmental damage is
strictly  convex in  aggregate emissions, then time  consistency problems  do  arise. In
particular, the rational expectations equilibrium under emission taxes exhibits excessive
incentives for the adoption of a new technology while the equilibrium under emissions
trading exhibits incentives for adoption that are too weak. However, it should be noted
that if an emissions trading program is intended to  implement technological efficiency
then  it  is  necessary  to  continually  adjust  the  supply  of  permits  in  response  to
technological change, even when damage  is linear.  This continual  adjustment is  not
needed for an emissions tax when damage is linear, a distinction that gives the emissions
tax a possible advantage over emissions trading.
2The  incentive  to  initiate  technological
development  should,  in  principle,  be  the
same for tradable permits and taxes.
OCDE (1999), p. 140.
31. Introduction
A key consideration in the choice of pollution control instruments is the incentive for
regulated firms to adopt cleaner technologies. The adoption of less polluting production
techniques holds the key to long term consumption growth with limited accompanying
environmental damage. More immediately, it allows firms to achieve pollution reduction
targets  at  lower  cost  and  with  potentially  smaller  impact  on  their  international
competitiveness. These issues are of particular importance to many developing countries
where high growth rates mean that a large number of key industrial technology choices
are being made on a daily basis. It is essential that those choices are the right ones if the
net benefits of growth are to be maximized.
Of course, the right technology is not necessarily the cleanest technology available. This
is especially true when an existing production technology is already employed and the
associated investment has been sunk. Retooling with a less polluting production method
or the retrofitting of abatement equipment can be very costly; that cost must be carefully
weighed against the benefits of reduced pollution from technological change. Thus, it is
not enough that policy instruments create incentives for technological change; they must
create the right incentives, in the sense that they induce technology adoption decisions
which correctly balance the benefits and costs of alternative technologies.
There is a wide array of pollution control policies available to  regulators and each of
them have different properties with respect to incentives for technological change. In this
paper we focus on emission taxes and emissions trading. These market-based instruments
are becoming increasingly popular in practice due in part to their dynamic incentives. By
attaching an  explicit price  to  emissions,  these policy  instruments create an  ongoing
incentive for firms to continually reduce their emission volumes. In contrast, command-
and-control type emission standards create incentives to adopt cleaner technologies only
up to the point where the standards are no longer binding (at which point the shadow
price on emissions falls to zero). However, the ongoing incentives created by market-
4based instruments are hot necessarily the tight incentives. In particular, time consistency.
constraints on the setting of these instruments can potentially limit the ability of the
regulator to set polices that implement efficiency as rational expectations equilibria with
respect to technology adoption choices. This paper explores these time consistency issues
for Pigouvian emission taxes and emissions trading.
We examine the policy problem under a range of conditions relating to the structure of
the "pollution market" and the nature of the environmental damage. We show that time
consistency constraints do not  limit the ability of the regulator to achieve a first-best
outcome if there is a continuum of regulated firms or if environmental damage is linear in
aggregate emissions. However, if there are relatively few regulated firms, such that there
is  strategic interaction between firms and the regulator, and environmental damage is
strictly  convex in  aggregate emissions,  then time  consistency problems  do  arise. In
particular, the rational expectations equilibrium under emission taxes exhibits excessive
incentives for the adoption of a new technology while the equilibrium under emissions
trading exhibits incentives for adoption that are too weak.
Our paper contributes to a broad existing literature on incentives for technological change
under environmental regulation.'  Downing and  White  (1986) examine the  incentive
effects of an emissions tax but they do not take account of time consistency issues and
whether or not the outcomes examined can in  fact be rational expectations equilibria.
Malueg (1989) argues that emissions trading may not create the right incentives for new
technology adoption but his analysis is also flawed by a failure to examine incentives in
equilibrium. The firms in his paper do not base their investment decisions on a rational
expectation  of  equilibrium  prices.  Milliman  and  Prince  (1989)  similarly  neglect
equilibrium considerations in their comparative analysis of emission taxes and emissions
trading.
See Kemp (1997) for a survey of this literature.
5Biglaiser, Horowitz and Quiggin (1995) examine incentives in a rational expectations
environment and claim that an emissions tax does not suffer from a time consistency
problem. Their result is correct in the context of their model but they restrict attention to
the case of linear damage. They also claim that technology adoption is distorted under
emissions trading because of a time consistency problem for the regulator.  However, this
problem arises in their model only when the investment decisions of individual firms
have a significant effect on aggregate emissions.  This possibility is not consistent with
their assumption of price-taking behavior on the permit market.  If firms are small players
in the permit market then there is no time inconsistency problem in their model (which
assumes  damage  is  linear)  and  no  associated  distortion  of  technology  investment
decisions.
Laffont  and  Tirole  (1996a)  and  (1996b)  also  examine technological  change  under
emissions trading. A primary focus of their work is the time consistency problems arising
from a non-unitary cost of public funds. They show that incentives for innovation are
weakened if the regulator cannot commit to distort future permit prices for the purpose of
raising revenue.
Jung, Krutilla and  Boyd (1996) compare the  incentive effects of  emission taxes and
emissions trading but they fail to account for time consistency issues. In particular, they
assume that firms expect the tax rate to remain unchanged after adoption of a cleaner
technology even though this tax rate is sub-optimal ex post.  Similarly, they assume that
firms expect the supply of permits to remain unchanged even though that supply is sub-
optimal ex post.  In their model these expectations are fulfilled in equilibrium but only
because the  regulator  fails to  make the  optimal adjustments.  Thus,  the  regulator is
assumed to be able to commit to a policy that is not time consistent. This also raises a
problem  with  their  comparative  analysis  of  taxes  and  permits  because  the  implicit
objective of their regulator varies with the instrument used to implement it. The implicit
objective under  a  tax  policy  is to  maintain the tax  rate constant  while the  implicit
6objective under permits is to achieve a given level of emissions. These objectives are not
consistent.
Our analysis focuses on the time  consistency of  policy and  its  implications for  the
importance of examining incentives in equilibrium. Our rational expectations framework
allows a direct and consistent comparison of emission taxes and emissions trading.  The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model on which our
analysis is based. Section 3 characterizes efficiency with respect to technology adoption
in the context of that model. Sections 4 and  5 then examine the circumstances under
which efficient technology choices can and cannot be implemented through a Pigouvian
emissions tax and emissions trading respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2.  The Model
Time  is  divided  into  two  periods.  In  period  1 each  of  n  firms  uses  a  production
technology  with  associated  abatement  cost  function  c0 (e- - e),  where  e  denotes
emissions, and e-  is the level of emissions corresponding to no abatement. Thus, e0 - e
represents  abatement.  Abatement  may  involve  a  variety  of  measures,  including  a
reduction  in  output,  a  change  in  inputs  or  some  end-of-pipe  remedial  action.  The
abatement cost function measures the least cost mix of abatement measures. Abatement
cost has the following important properties: co > 0 and co'  > 0.
A cleaner technology becomes available at the beginning of period 2. It can be adopted
by  any  firm  at  some  fixed  installation  cost  K.  This  technology  has  an  associated
abatement cost function cl  (e-,  - e)  with c; > 0 and c' > 0, where e- < To and c; < co for
any  e < e0. Thus, any positive level of abatement can be achieved at lower cost with the
new technology.
7Polluting firms are assumed to be price-takers on the product market. This means that
private  and social marginal abatement cost coincide. It  is important to note that this
assumption can hold even if the number of polluting firms in the regulated region is small
since the regulated firms do not necessarily constitute the whole industry. Such is the
case, for example, when polluting firms take world prices as given.
Environmental  damage  D(E)  in  any  period  is  an  increasing  function  of  aggregate
emissions E in that period. That is, attention is restricted to the case of a dissipative
pollutant  that  is  uniformly mixed  relative  to  the  regulated  region.  Two  cases  are
considered with respect to the damage function: D"(E)  > 0 (strictly convex damage) and
D"(E)  = 0 (linear damage). 2
3.  Efficiency
We begin with an analysis of a single firm since this helps to illuminate the key issues
with respect to efficiency in technology adoption. We then examine the case with many
firms.
3.1 A Single  Firm
Figure 1 illustrates the marginal damage schedule drawn for the case of linear damage.
Marginal damage is  denoted by  d.  Also illustrated are the  marginal abatement  cost
schedules associated with the old and new technologies, labeled c' (e-  - e)  and c, (  - e)
respectively. The efficient level of emissions if the firm uses technology i is e;  such that
c,'(F,  -e)  =
2 Some  environmental  problems  are possibly  characterized  by concave  damage  at very  high pollution  levels
but we have  not examined  that case  here.
For clarity,  all graphs  are drawn  for the case  where e-  = e  , = J.
8The shaded area in Figure 1 represents the social benefit obtained if the firm adopts the
cleaner technology. This social benefit comprises the reduction in damage associated with
the fall in emissions from  eo to  e,  represented by area (A+C) plus any reduction in
abatement cost associated with switching to the cleaner technology, represented by area
(B-C)  in  the  Figure.  Note  that  abatement  cost  could  be  higher  under  the  cleaner
technology  since  efficiency  requires  that  more  abatement  is  undertaken  for  that
technology. However, the overall social benefit is necessarily positive. Let G denote that
social benefit.
Figure 2 illustrates an increasing marginal damage schedule, labeled D'(E).  The efficient
level of emissions for the firm if it uses technology i is e;  such that c'(F- - e*) = D'(e*).
The shaded area in Figure 2 represents the social benefit obtained if the firm adopts the
cleaner technology. It  has the same interpretation as in the constant marginal damage
case.
Whether or not adoption of the cleaner technology yields a positive net social benefit
depends on the size of the adoption cost K. Adoption is worthwhile if and only if G > K.
It is clear from Figures 1 and 2 that adoption of the cleaner technology is most likely to
be worthwhile if marginal damage is high and the difference between marginal abatement
costs is significant.
3.2  Many  Firms
Now suppose there are n > 1 regulated firms. Let m denote the number of firms to adopt
the cleaner technology. Efficient emission levels for a given value of m are given by
eo  (m) and e, (m) such that
(1)  c'(FO  - eOi(m))  = cl'(F - e,  (m)) = D'(E(m))
where
9(2)  E(m) = me, (m)  + (n - m)eO (m)
Note that if damage is linear then the efficient emission levels are independent of m. In
contrast, if damage is strictly convex then  eo(m) > 0,  e(m)  > 0  and  E'(m)  <  0.  These
important properties reflect the fact that if more firms use the cleaner technology then
marginal damage is lower (when D" > 0), and so the balance between marginal damage
and marginal abatement cost calls for a higher level of emissions from any individual
firm using a given technology.
Next consider efficiency with respect to technology adoption. Figure 3 illustrates the case
of n = 2 and linear damage. The shaded area represents the social benefit from adoption
of the new technology by one of the firms. (Net social benefit is this shaded area less the
cost of adoption). Efficiency requires that emissions for the adopting firm fall from eo to
e'; emissions for the non-adopting firm are unchanged at eo, while aggregate emissions
fall from  E(O) to  E(1).  The social benefit from adoption comprises the reduction in
damage associated with the fall in aggregate emissions plus any reduction in abatement
cost for the adopting firm.
The picture is somewhat more complicated when damage is strictly convex. Figures 4(a)
and 4(b) illustrate the adoption of the new technology by one of the two firms. Efficiency
requires that emissions for the adopting firm fall from eo  (0) to  e, (1), and that emissions
for the  non-adopting firm rise from  eo(O) to  eo(1). The efficient level  of  aggregate
emissions falls from E(O) to E(l).  The shaded areas in figure 4(a) reflect  the reduction
in  abatement cost for the adopting firm: area (B-A). The shaded areas in  figure 4(b)
represent  the  other components  of  the  social  benefit  from  adoption:  area  D  is  the
reduction  in  damage  associated with  the  fall  in  aggregate emissions; area  C  is  the
reduction in  abatement cost for the non-adopting firm  associated with  the rise  in  its
emissions. Note that this latter component of social benefit does not arise in the linear
10damage case. Figure 4(c) combines the areas in figures 4(a) and 4(b) to  illustrate the
overall social benefit from adoption by one firm.
Now consider the social benefit from adoption by the second firm. This is illustrated in
figure 5. Efficiency requires that emissions for the adopting firm fall from eo  (1) to e, (2),
and that emissions for the existing new technology firm rise from  e, (1) to  e, (2).  The
efficient level of aggregate emissions falls from E(1) to E(2).  A comparison of figures 5
and 4c reveals that the social benefit from the second firm adopting the new technology is
less than the social benefit from the first  firm adopting. This  is due to  the fact that
marginal damage falls when the first firm adopts, so the social benefit from the second
firm adopting is smaller. Since the cost of adoption is constant, this means that efficiency
may require strictly partial adoption: some firms should adopt the cleaner technology and
some firms should retain the old technology, even though all firms are identical ex ante.
In  contrast,  strictly partial  adoption  is  never  efficient when  damage  is  linear  since
marginal damage is constant in that case, and so the social benefit from adoption by one
firm is independent of how many firms adopt. Efficiency in that case requires adoption of
the cleaner technology either by all firms (if K is relatively small) or by no firms (if K is
relatively large). Of course, a corner solution can also be efficient in the strictly convex
damage case if K is large enough or small enough.
4.  Implementation with an Emissions Tax4
The timing of the game between the firms and the regulator is as follows. In period 1 the
tax  is  set  according  to  the  Pigouvian rule  for  the  prevailing technology.  The  new
technology arrives at the beginning of period 2 and the regulator announces a tax rate for
that period. Firms then decide whether or not to adopt the cleaner technology, taking as
given  the simultaneous  technology  adoption decisions of  other  firms.  The regulator
4 The  main results  in section  are reported  in  more  detail in Kennedy  and Laplante  (1997).
11cannot commit to a tax rate that is time inconsistent. That is, the tax rate announced for
period 2 must be consistent with the technology choices that the tax induces.
4.1 A Single  Firm
The equilibrium to the game between the firm and the regulator depends importantly on
whether damage is linear or strictly convex. We examine each case in turn.
(a) Linear Damage
The unit tax rate on emissions is set equal to marginal damage: t  = 6.  This is illustrated
in Figure 1. Note that this optimal tax rate is independent of which technology is in place
because marginal  damage  is  constant. The  firm  responds to  the  tax  by  setting  its
emissions level to equate its marginal abatement cost with the tax rate:  c,'(F-  - e;) = t*.
Thus, the firm chooses  eo  if it uses the old  technology, and  e,  if  it uses the new
technology.  That  is,  the  emissions  tax  implements  static  efficiency  for  any  given
technology.
The private  benefit to  the  firm from  adopting the cleaner technology comprises the
reduction in tax payments, t * (e  - e),  plus any reduction in abatement cost. Note that
the reduced tax payments correspond exactly to the reduced environmental damage since
t  = 6.  It follows that the private benefit to the firm from adopting the new technology is
identical to the social benefit. Thus, the emissions tax also implements efficiency with
respect to technology adoption.
(b) Strictly Convex Damage
The  regulatory  problem  is  somewhat more  complicated when  marginal  damage  is
increasing. For an emissions tax to implement the efficient level of emissions for any
given technology i, the tax rate must be set equal to marginal damage evaluated at the
efficient level of emissions; that is, t;  = D'(e*).  Thus, the tax rate required depends on
which technology is in use. This creates a potential time consistency problem for the
12regulator. If adoption of the new-  technology is efficient then the regulator would like to
announce a tax rate t,  for period 2. Conversely, if adoption of the new technology is not
efficient then the regulator would like to announce a tax rate t,  for period 2. The problem
is that a tax rate of to may actually induce the firm to adopt the new technology, while a
tax rate  of  t,  may induce the  firm to  retain the  old  technology. In  both  cases the
announced tax rate would not be optimal ex post and hence could not be committed to ex
ante.
Under what conditions will this time consistency problem arise? Suppose adoption of the
new technology is not efficient; that is, G < K.  Then the first-best tax rate for period 2 is
to.  Figure  6  illustrates the  private  benefit  to  the  firm  from  adoption  of  the  new
technology  at this  fixed tax rate.  If the firm retains the  old  technology then it  sets
emissions equal to  eo .Conversely, if it adopts the new technology then it sets emissions
equal to  e,(t,).  Let  B(t,)  denote the private benefit from adoption at to.  Comparing
Figures 2 and 6 reveals that  B(to) > G.  That is, the private benefit from adoption at to
exceeds  the  social  benefit  from  adoption.  This  does  not  necessarily  create  a  time
consistency problem. In particular, if  B(to) < K then adoption of the new technology is
not privately worthwhile for the firm, and  so  to  is optimal ex post.  In this  case the
announced to  tax rate is credible, and the Pigouvian tax policy implements efficiency
with respect to technology adoption.
However, if  B(to) > K  then to will induce adoption of the new technology, and so  to
will not be optimal ex post. In this case the regulator cannot commit to the first-best tax
rate. The best the regulator can do in this case is to announce that it will set the tax at t*
if the firm does not adopt the new technology, and set the tax at t,  if the firm does adopt
the new technology; no other Pigouvian tax strategy is time  consistent. Milliman and
Prince (1989) refer to this policy as tax ratcheting.
13Figure 7 illustrates the private benefit to the firm from,adoption of the new technology
under the tax ratcheting policy. If the firm retains the old technology then it faces a tax
rate of to and sets emissions at e. .Conversely, if it adopts the new technology it faces a
tax rate of  t,  and sets emissions at  e,.  Let  B(to,t, )  denote the private benefit from
adoption in this case. Comparing Figures 3 and 7 reveals that B(to , t  ) > B(to).  It follows
that if  B(to  ) > K 2 G then  B(to  , tl ) > K > G.  Thus, if efficiency calls for retention of
the old technology but  to is not time consistent, then the only time consistent policy is
ratcheting, and this policy induces the inefficient adoption of the new technology.
There is no corresponding problem if efficiency calls for adoption of the new technology
(that is, if G > K). In this case the first-best tax rate for period 2 is t; . Figure 8 illustrates
the private benefit to the firm from adoption of the new technology at this tax rate. If the
firm retains the old technology then it sets emissions equal to  eO  (t; ).  Conversely, if it
adopts the new technology then it sets emissions equal to  e . Let  B(t;)  denote the
private benefit from adoption at tj . Comparing Figures 2 and 8 reveals that  B(t;)  < G.
That is, the private benefit from adoption at  t;  is less than the social benefit. This does
not create a time consistency problem if  B(t )>  K  since in that case the firm will adopt
the cleaner technology at t,  even though B(t)  < G. Conversely, if  B(tl ) < K then t,  is
not time consistent and the only time consistent policy is tax ratcheting. However, if
G > K  then B(t  , ti ) > K  since  B(to  , t  ) > G. Thus, if efficiency calls for adoption of
the new technology then ratcheting will always implement that outcome.
These results indicate that the emissions tax cannot induce too little technological change
but it can induce too much technological change. This problem with the emissions tax
stems from the fact that it does not discriminate across units of emissions according to the
damage they cause. The tax rate is set equal to the damage caused by the marginal unit of
emissions and this tax rate is applied to every unit of emissions. This means that when
marginal damage is increasing the total tax payment exceeds the total damage done. In
14assessing the private benefit to adopting a cleaner technology, the firm thinks in terms of
reduced tax payments but what matters from a  social perspective is reduced damage.
Since the reduction in tax payments under ratcheting exceeds the reduction in damage,
the firm's  incentive is distorted in favour of cleaner technology adoption. This generates
the wrong technology choice if efficiency calls for retention of the old technology.
It is important to note that the dynamic incentive problem associated with the emissions
tax is not due to the assumed timing of the game between the regulator and the firm. We
have assumed that the regulator moves first by announcing a tax rate to which the firm
responds with a technology choice. An alternative timing of the game would have the
firm leading with a technology adoption decision and the regulator responding with the
announcement of  a tax  rate. Under this timing  the only  time  consistent strategy the
regulator  can  ever play  is  ratcheting.  The  outcome  to  this  differently  timed  game
corresponds to the outcome of the game we have examined where the regulator moves
first but the time consistency constraint is binding.
4.2 Many  Firms
We now turn to the case of many firns.  For any given m, where m is the number of firms
that adopt the new technology, the optimal tax rate is equal to marginal damage evaluated
at the efficient level of aggregate emissions:
(3)  t(m) =  D'(E(m))
Thus, if  D"= 0  then  t'(m) = 0,  and if  D" > 0  then  t'(m) <0.  This tax induces the
efficient emission levels for given technologies; that is, a firm with technology i chooses
its emissions ei  (t(m))  such that
(4)  ci'(F-  - ei  (t(m))) = t(m)
This implements equation (1); that is, e, (t(m)) = ei (m)  Vi.
15Whether or not the tax implements efficiency with respect to cleaner technology adoption
depends again on whether damage is linear or strictly convex. We consider each case in
turn.
(a) Strictly Convex Damage
Recall from the single firm case that the first-best tax rate may not be time consistent
when damage is strictly convex. The same potential problem arises in the case of many
firms and is in fact more acute. In particular, if efficiency requires strictly partial adoption
of the new technology (0 < m  <  n ) then the corresponding first-best tax rate is never
time consistent. Why? If an announced fixed tax rate of  t(m*)  induces adoption of the
new technology by any firm then it will induce adoption by all firms; it cannot induce
strictly partial adoption among ex ante identical firms. Thus, if efficiency calls for strictly
partial adoption then the associated first-best tax rate, t(m*), cannot be time consistent.
If the first-best tax rate is not time consistent then the only time consistent tax Pigouvian
policy is ratcheting. Ratcheting in the context of many firms simply means announcing
that the ex post  tax rate will be set according to equation (3), based on the number of
firms that  adopt the new  technology. The equilibrium induced by ratcheting exhibits
excessive incentives for the adoption of the new technology. This is illustrated in figure 9
for the case of  n = 2  and  m* = 1. The shaded area in figure 9 represents the private
benefit  to  the second  firm from  adopting  the new  technology.  This  private  benefit
comprises the reduction in tax payments plus any reduction in abatement cost. Comparing
figures 9 and 5 reveals that the private benefit exceeds the social benefit. Thus, there is an
excessive incentive for the second firm to adopt. The basic intuition behind this result is
the same as for the case of a single firm: the total tax payments made under the Pigouvian
emissions tax exceed the true external cost of emissions when damage is strictly convex.
(b) Linear Damage
16When damage is linear the optimal tax rate is independent of the technologies used and so
there is no potential time  consistency problem for the regulator. Thus, the Pigouvian
emissions tax policy implements efficiency with  respect to technology adoption. The
intuition behind the result is straightforward. When damage is linear the tax payments by
a firm are exactly equal to the damage caused by its emissions. It follows that the private
and social benefit from cleaner technology adoption coincide.
4.3  A Continuum of Firms
It is worth noting that when there is a continuum of firms, the Pigouvian emissions tax
policy  implements efficiency with  respect to technology  adoption even if  damage is
strictly convex. The reason is straightforward. If there is a continuum of firms then each
firm is insignificant relative to the aggregate, and so each firm perceives that  its own
technology adoption choice has no impact on the tax rate chosen by the regulator.
5. Implementation with Emissions Trading
We now turn  to  the  potential time  consistency  problems associated  with  emissions
trading. It is important to note at the outset that we assume the regulator is committed to
adjusting the  aggregate supply  of  permits to  maintain  an  efficient balance between
marginal damage and marginal abatement costs. Thus, we assume that the regulator has
the same objective whether the policy instrument of choice is  an emissions tax or an
emissions  trading  program.  This  ensures  a  consistent  comparison between  the  two
instruments.
We examine a  tradeable permit program that operates  in the  following way.  At the
beginning of period 1 the regulator issues an aggregate number of permits corresponding
to the efficient level of emissions based on the existing technology (used by all firms in
period 1). It is not  important for the problem at hand whether permits are issued by
auction  or  through  some  sort  of  grandfathering  scheme  provided  that  the  initial
distribution does not create asymmetric market power. Each permit allows one unit of
17emissions dunng period 1. We assume that no banking,Is  allowed (which means that
permits unused in period 1 cannot be carried forward to period 2).5 The new technology
arrives at the beginning of period 2 and the regulator then issues permits for use in period
2.  The regulator may or may not then have to re-adjust that supply of permits in response
to the technology adoption that actually occurs in equilibrium, depending on whether or
not the first-best permit supply is time consistent.
Recall that the first-best tax rate under an  emissions tax  is the tax rate that induces
efficiency with  respect  to  technology  adoption  and  at  the  same time  generates  the
efficient level of aggregate emissions given the technologies in place. If this tax rate is
not time consistent then the regulator must use tax ratcheting. Similarly, the first-best
supply of permits (and associated equilibrium permit price) is that which induces efficient
technology adoption choices and at the same time corresponds to the efficient aggregate
level of emissions, given those technology choices. If this first-best permit supply is not
time consistent then the regulator must use a responsive policy, akin to tax ratcheting,
whereby the supply of permits is set at the beginning of period 2 and then adjusted ex
post  in response to equilibrium technology choices. As in the case of an emissions tax,
the time  consistency of the first-best solution depends on the  nature of the  damage
function and on the number of regulated firms. We begin with a situation in which there
is a continuum of firms and then consider a situation where the number of firms is small
enough that each firm has some market power in the permit market. In both cases we
examine a situation with linear damage and a situation with strictly convex damage.
5.1 A Continuum  of Firms
(a) Linear Damage
Recall from section 4 that when damage is linear the regulator does not need to respond
to technological change if an emissions tax is used. The tax rate is simply set equal to
marginal damage and  no adjustment is  required. Moreover, this  tax  rate creates  the
Allowing  banking  makes  no difference  at all since  the arrival  of a new technology  in period  2 with  lower
abatement  costs  means  that  the option  to bank  would  never be exercised.
18correct incentives for technological change to occur. Thus, the regulator does not need to
respond to the advent of a cleaner technology.
In contrast, the advent of a new technology requires a reassessment of the permit supply
under  an  emissions  trading program even when  damage is  linear. In  particular, the
aggregate supply of permits that is efficient for an existing technology will generally not
be efficient if a new technology is adopted; the first-best permit supply depends on the
technologies in use. Recall from section 3 that when damage is linear, efficiency requires
either adoption of the new technology by all firms or retention of the old technology by
all firms, depending on the magnitude of the  adoption cost.  If  efficiency calls for
universal  adoption then the first-best aggregate permit  supply  is  E;  = ne 1 such that
c, (e,  - e' ) =3a.  In  contrast,  if  efficiency  calls  for  universal  retention  of  the  old
technology then the first-best permit supply is EX,  =  neo > El  such that co  (eo  - eO)  = 6.
Consider first the case where efficiency calls  for universal adoption. If the regulator
issues the corresponding first-best number of permits then adoption by all firms is the
equilibrium response and the permit supply is efficient ex post. The key to this result is
the fact that the ex post equilibrium price of permits is equal to marginal damage; thus,
the private benefit from adoption to any individual firm is, in equilibrium, exactly equal
to the social benefit.
Similarly, if efficiency calls for retention of the old technology and the permnit  supply is
left unchanged from period 1, then the ex post price of permits in an equilibrium with no
adoption is equal to marginal damage, and so the private  benefit to adoption in  that
equilibrium is equal to the social benefit. Thus, leaving the supply of permits unchanged
between periods is time consistent and induces efficiency.
It is important to emphasize that leaving the supply of permits unchanged in response to
the advent of a new technology ensures efficiency with respect to the adoption of that
19technology only if efficiency calls for no adoption. If the regulator does not adjust the
supply of permits ex ante then the permit price in a candidate equilibrium in which all
firms adopt the new technology would be lower than marginal damage and so the private
benefit to adoption in that candidate equilibrium would be less than the social benefit.
The private benefit to adoption in the candidate equilibrium could therefore be less than
the  cost  of  adoption,  in  which  case adoption  by  all  firms  could not  in  fact be  an
equilibrium even though adoption by all  firms is  efficient. Thus,  ensuring efficiency
when  efficiency calls  for the  adoption of  the new  technology  generally requires an
adjustment to the supply of permits in response to the advent of that new technology even
when damage is linear.
(b) Strictly Convex Damage
Recall from section 4 that when damage is  strictly convex the regulator faces a time
consistency problem with an emissions tax when there is a relatively small number of
firms but that problem vanishes when there are a continuum of firms because each firm is
insignificant relative to the aggregate and so perceives an independence between its own
choices and the policies implemented by the regulator. The same is true in the case of
emissions trading with a continuum of firms: there are no time  consistency problems
associated with implementation of the first-best policy  even when  damage is  strictly
convex.
The policy problem  for the regulator in  this  case is  in fact somewhat simpler under
emissions trading than under an emissions tax. Recall that strictly convex damage means
that efficiency may require strictly partial adoption of the new technology. In that case
the regulator must use tax ratcheting since committing to the first-best tax rate ex ante
cannot induce asymmetric technology choices by ex ante symmetric firms, as required for
an efficient equilibrium. In contrast, under emissions trading the regulator can set the
first-best permit  supply at  the beginning  of period  2,  without the  need  for ex post
adjustment, and nonetheless induce an asymmetric and time consistent equilibrium.
20The key to  this  result is the flexibility of  the permit price to  respond to  technology
adoption choices in equilibrium. The equilibrium price of permits is decreasing in the
number of firms that adopt the new technology since the demand for permits is lower
when more firms use the new technology. This equilibrating role of the permit price
means that the private benefit to any firm from adopting the new technology is decreasing
in the number firms using that technology, and this in turn allows an equilibrium to exist
in which some firms adopt but additional potential adopters find it unprofitable to do so.
No comparable automatic adjustment to the price of emissions occurs under a fixed tax
rate policy; hence the need for explicit tax ratcheting.
The equilibrium induced by the first-best supply adjustment is efficient. Each firm takes
the permit price as independent of  its own action, and since each firm is insignificant
relative to the aggregate, marginal damage is  effectively constant with respect to the
emissions of each individual firm. Thus, the saving to the firm from having to hold fewer
permits at the first-best equilibrium price fully reflects the reduction in damage.
5.2 A Small  Number  of Firms
The conditions required for a "perfectly competitive" permit market breakdown when
there are only a  "small" number of firms. However, emissions trading can still yield
valuable  efficiency  gains  under  such  circumstances  and  can  still  be  an  effective
regulatory instrument if potentially destructive collusive and predatory practices can be
controlled.  Our approach here is  to abstract  from these potential  "anti-competitive"
problems and  focus on  the  implications  of  strategic interaction  between firms,  and
between individual firms and the regulator, for the time consistency of permit  supply
adjustment policy. We begin with the case of linear damage.
21(i) Linear Damage
The key issue of interest is the same as in the case with a continuum of firms: is it a time
consistent  policy  for  the  regulator  to  issue the  first-best number  of  permits  at  the
beginning of period 2 without the need for expost adjustment?
Consider first the case where efficiency calls for retention of the old technology by all
firms. (Recall that efficiency requires "all or nothing" when damage is linear). Suppose
the regulator issues permits corresponding to the associated first-best level of aggregate
emissions:  E(O)  = ne 0 (0).  Retention of  the  old  technology  by  all  firms  will  be  an
equilibrium response to  this policy  if no  firm has  an incentive to  deviate from that
equilibrium by adopting the new technology.
Consider the incentives for a potentially deviating firm. This firm is not  a price-taker
since the permit market is not characterized by perfect competition. The firm must instead
sell permits through individual bargaining with other firms. The specific trading schedule
the potential deviant faces depends on the number of firms in the market and the nature of
the bargaining  game between firms.  However, that  schedule must  have two  general
properties. First, the trading schedule cannot lie above 5  since no firm will be willing to
purchase a permit if the asking price is higher than its marginal abatement cost. Since
c' (e - eo  (0)) = a  at the candidate equilibrium, and since  c'  > 0,  it follows that the
potential deviant cannot sell a permit for a price higher than  d.  Second, the trading
schedule cannot be downward sloping (since c'  > 0).  An example schedule satisfying
these two properties is illustrated as SS  is figure 10. Faced with this trading schedule the
deviating firm sets emissions at  e,  and the private  benefit  from its  new technology
adoption is the shaded area in  figure 10. A comparison with figure  1 reveals that the
private benefit to the deviating firm cannot be greater than the social benefit from that
deviation (and will generally be less). Since the social benefit is less than the cost of
adoption (by nature of the fact that efficiency here by construction involves no adoption),
it  follows that  the private benefit  is  also less than the  cost  of adoption,  and so the
22deviation is not privately optimal. Thus, universal retention of the old technology is a
time consistent equilibrium response to the first-best permit supply policy when universal
retention of the old technology is efficient.
The first-best policy is also time-consistent when efficiency calls for universal adoption
of the new technology. The argument is exactly analogous to one just made. Figure 11
illustrates the private benefit to a deviating firm that retains the old technology when all
other firms adopt the new technology. The deviating firm cannot purchase permits for
less than the lowest marginal abatement cost of the other firms, and  so the deviating
firm's trading schedule cannot lie below a  for permit pruchases. Thus, the private cost
(or foregone benefit) of retaining the old technology for the deviating firm (the shaded
area in figure 11) must exceed the social benefit from adoption, which in turn exceeds the
cost of adoption. Thus, the avoided cost of adoption for the deviating firm is less than the
cost of the deviation, and so the deviation is not worthwhile. Thus, universal adoption of
the new technology  is a time  consistent equilibrium response to the  first-best permit
supply policy when universal adoption is efficient.
(ii) Strictly Convex Damage
In section 4 we argued that strictly convex damage combined with relatively few firms
means that a Pigouvian emissions tax is generally not able to implement efficiency with
respect to technology adoption. In particular, unless efficiency involves a corner solution,
the  only  time  consistent tax  policy  is  ratcheting, and  this  policy  creates  excessive
incentives for technology adoption. A similar problem arises under emissions trading but
with the opposite implication for incentives.
Figures 9 and  12 illustrate the comparison between the tax policy  and the emissions
trading policy for the case of two firms and where m* = 1. Recall that the shaded area in
figure 9 represents the private benefit (under ratcheting) to the remaining old technology
firrn if it deviates from the first-best solution. In comparison, the shaded area in figure 12
illustrates the maximum private benefit to the remaining old technology firm if it deviates
23from the first-best solution under emissions trading, where the supply of permits has been
fixed at its first-best level. This area can be explained as follows. The maximum price the
deviating firm can obtain for permits sold to the new technology firm is the latter firm's
marginal abatement cost. The schedule labeled SS in figure 12 plots that maximum price.
Faced with  this  trading schedule, the deviating firm will set  emissions at  e,  and  so
derives a private benefit from the deviation equal to the shaded area. A less favorable
bargaining solution for the deviating fim  will mean a smaller benefit than the shaded
area. Comparing figures 9 and 12 shows that the private benefit to the deviating firm is
strictly less under emissions trading than under an emissions tax. Thus, the private benefit
to deviation under emissions trading is less likely to  exceed the cost of adoption than
under the emissions tax. This means that under some  conditions the first-best permit
supply policy will be time consistent (and so implement efficiency) while the emissions
tax policy leads to excessive technology adoption.
When the private benefit to deviation from the first-best solution does exceed the cost of
adoption, the first-best permit supply policy will not be time consistent: the permit supply
corresponding to the first-best technology choices will not implement those choices and
so will not be optimal ex post. In such cases the only time consistent permit supply policy
is a type of ratcheting, whereby the regulator initially issues the same number of permits
in period 2 as in period 1 but then buys back permits to adjust the supply in response to
technology adoption choices. Suppose the regulator cannot expropriate permits but must
repurchase permits  from  willing  sellers. Then the  only  time  consistent policy  is  to
announce that permits will be repurchased at a price equal to marginal damage evaluated
at the optimum, given the technologies in place.
This is illustrated in figure 13. At the beginning of period 2 both firms are using the old
technology and the regulator issues E(O) permits accordingly. Suppose one of the firms
then adopts the new technology, in which case the efficient level of aggregate emissions
falls to  E(l).  The regulator then offers to buy permits at price  p(l) = MD(E(l)).  At that
24price the adopting firm is willing to sell eO  (0) - ei  (1) permits. The non-adopting firm is
willing to pay a price higher than p(l)  for eo  (1)  - eo  (0) permits and so the adopting firm
sells this many permits to the non-adopting firm. The remaining E(0) - E(1) permits are
sold back to the regulator. The resulting equilibrium is efficient, given the technologies in
use. No other repurchase price will induce an efficient supply adjustment and so no other
policy is time consistent.
The shaded  area  in  figure  13 represents the maximum private  benefit  to  the  single
adopting firm under  the permit  supply ratcheting policy. This  benefit  comprises the
payment received from the regulator for repurchased permits, plus the maximum possible
payment  from  the  adopting  firm for  traded permits,  plus  any  reduction  in  its  own
abatement costs. In comparison, recall from figure 4(c) the social benefit from adoption
by one firm. It is clear that the private benefit under-represents the social benefit. Thus,
the permit supply ratcheting policy tends to create an under-incentive for the adoption of
the new technology. Recall that the opposite result obtains for an emissions tax but the
underlying reason is of the same nature. The ratcheting policy under emissions trading
creates an under-incentive for adoption because the payment received from the regulator
for the repurchased permits under-states the social value of the reduced damage.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the time consistency properties of a Pigouvian emissions
tax and emissions trading. Our main results can be summarized as follows. If damage is
linear  then  efficiency  with  respect to  technology  adoption  involves either  universal
adoption of the new technology or universal retention of the old technology depending on
the cost of adoption. The first-best tax policy and the first-best permit supply policy are
both time consistent under these conditions, and the induced equilibrium is efficient.
If damage is strictly convex then efficiency may require strictly partial adoption of the
new technology. In  this  case the  first-best tax policy  is not  time  consistent and  tax
25ratcheting must be used. Ratcheting will nonetheless inducei an efficie4t equilibrium if
there is a continuum of firms. If there are relatively few firms then ratcheting creates
excessive incentives for adoption of the new technology. Thus, the resulting equilibrium
may involve too much adoption.
The first-best permit supply policy is time consistent if there is a continuum of firms and
induces the efficient solution. If there are relatively few firms then the first-best policy
may not be time consistent, and the regulator must use permit supply ratcheting. This
policy  creates an  under-incentive for firms  to  adopt the new  technology.  Thus,  the
resulting equilibrium may involve too little adoption.
Since both the Pigouvian emission tax and emissions trading both  potentially fail to
induce efficiency when damage is strictly convex and there are relatively few firms, our
results  do not speak strongly in favour of one instrument over the other. However, it
should  be  noted  that  if  an  emissions  trading  program  is  intended  to  implement
technological efficiency then it is necessary to continually adjust the supply of permits in
response to technological change, even when damage is linear. This continual adjustment
is not needed for an emissions tax when damage is linear, a distinction that gives the
emissions tax a possible advantage over emissions trading.
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FIGURE  1
Social  benefit  from  technology  adoption
(linear  damage)
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FIGURE  2
Social  benefit  from  technology  adoption
(strictly  convex  damage)
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FIGURE 3
Social benefit from technology
adoption by one firm
(linear damage)
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FIGURE  4a
Adoption  by one firm: reduction  in
abatement  cost for the adopting  firm
(strictly  convex  damage)
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FIGURE  4b
Adoption  by one firm: reduction  in
damage  and reduction  in abatement
cost for the non-adopting  firm
(strictly  convex  damage)
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FIGURE  4c
Social  benefit from adoption by one firm
(strictly  convex  damage)
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FIGURE 5
Social benefit from adoption
by the second firm
(strictly convex damage)
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FIGURE  6
Private  benefit  from  technology  adoption
(at to*)
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FIGURE  7
Private  benefit  from  technology
adoption  under  ratcheting
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FIGURE 8
Private benefit from technology adoption
(at  tj)
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FIGURE 10
Private benefit to a deviating firm
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FIGURE 11
Private benefit to a deviating firm
that retains the old technology
(linear damage)
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FIGURE  12
Private  benefit  to the
second  adopting  firm
at the first-best  permit  supply
(strictly  convex  damage)
41$
\  cO~~(e  - e)  D'(E)
cl'(e  -
e 1(1)  eo  (0)  eo  (1)  E(1)  E(O)  e  E
FIGURE 13
Private benefit from adoption by one
firm under permit supply ratcheting
(strictly convex damage)
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